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Hybrid Deep Learning for Botnet Attack Detection
in the Internet of Things Networks
Segun I. Popoola, Bamidele Adebisi, Mohammad Hammoudeh, Guan Gui, Haris Gacanin
Abstract—Deep Learning (DL) is an efficient method for botnet
attack detection. However, the volume of network traffic data and
memory space required is usually large. It is, therefore, almost
impossible to implement the DL method in memory-constrained
IoT devices. In this paper, we reduce the feature dimensionality
of large-scale IoT network traffic data using the encoding phase
of Long Short-Term Memory Autoencoder (LAE). In order to
classify network traffic samples correctly, we analyse the long-
term inter-related changes in the low-dimensional feature set
produced by LAE using deep Bidirectional Long Short-Term
Memory (BLSTM). Extensive experiments are performed with
the BoT-IoT dataset to validate the effectiveness of the proposed
hybrid DL method. Results show that LAE significantly reduced
the memory space required for large-scale network traffic data
storage by 91.89%, and it outperformed state-of-the-art feature
dimensionality reduction methods by 18.92−27.03%. Despite the
significant reduction in feature size, the deep BLSTM model
demonstrates robustness against model under-fitting and over-
fitting. It also achieves good generalisation ability in binary and
multi-class classification scenarios.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, botnet detection, dimension-
ality reduction, Long Short-Term Memory, autoencoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, critical infrastructures such as power gen-eration [1]–[4], communications [5]–[7], healthcare [8]–
[10], manufacturing [11]–[13], transportation [14], [15], water
treatment [16] and agriculture [17], [18] are interconnected
in order to tap into the various benefits of the Internet of
Things (IoT) [19]–[21]. The increased inter-connectivity and
the use of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) renders smart
critical infrastructures vulnerable to cyberattacks from terror-
ists or “hacktivists”. For instance, ICS and IoT devices have
been proven to be easily hackable and remotely controllable to
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form IoT-based botnets [22], [23]. Successful exploitation of
a single vulnerable IoT device can lead to leakage of sensitive
information and serious security breaches in the wider IoT-
enabled system [24]. This makes them an attractive target to
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) of diverse botnet attacks,
especially when they are deployed in critical environments.
To secure connected IoT devices against complex botnet at-
tacks, Machine Learning (ML) techniques have been employed
to develop Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS),
e.g., [25]. Such NIDS can be installed at strategic points
within an IoT network. Specifically, Deep Learning (DL),
an advanced ML approach, offers a unique capability for
automatic extraction of features from large-scale, high-speed
network traffic generated by interconnected heterogeneous
IoT devices [26]. Considering the resource-constraints in IoT
devices, NIDS techniques used in classical computer networks
are not efficient for botnet detection in IoT systems due to
high computation and memory requirements [27]. In order
to develop an efficient DL method for botnet detection in
IoT networks, sufficiently large network traffic information is
needed to guarantee efficient classification performance [28].
However, processing and analyzing high-dimensional network
traffic data can lead to curse of dimensionality [29]. Also,
training DL models with such high-dimensional data can cause
Hughes phenomena [30]. High-dimensional data processing
is complex and requires huge computational resources and
storage capacity [31], [32]. IoT devices do not have sufficient
memory space to store big network traffic data required for
DL. Therefore, there is a need for end-to-end DL-based botnet
detection method that will reduce high dimensionality of big
network traffic features and also detect complex and recent
botnet attacks accurately based on low-dimensional network
traffic information.
Currently, Bot-IoT dataset [33] is the most relevant publicly
available dataset for botnet attack detection in IoT networks
because it: (a) has IoT network traffic samples; (b) captured
complete network information; (c) has a diversity of complex
IoT botnet attack scenarios; (d) contains accurate ground
truth labels; and (e) provides massive volume of labeled data
required for effective supervised DL. The original feature
dimensionality1 of the Bot-IoT dataset is 43, and the memory
space required to store this network traffic data is 1.085
GB. So far, feature dimensionality reduction methods that
have been applied to the Bot-IoT dataset were all based on
feature selection techniques. These techniques include the filter
1Feature dimensionality is the total number of network traffic features in a
given dataset
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method with Pearson Correlation and Entropy (PCE) [33],
X-Mean clustering with Particle Swarm Optimisation (XMP)
[34], and Information Gain (IFG) [35].
On the other hand, Long Short-Term Memory Autoen-
coder (LAE) is an effective DL method that produces a
low-dimensional latent-space feature representation of a high-
dimensional feature set at its hidden layer. To the best of
our knowledge, this DL method has not been previously
applied to reduce the dimensionality of the feature set in the
Bot-IoT dataset. Also, deep Bidirectional Long Short-Term
Memory (BLSTM) is a DL method that learns hierarchical
feature representations and long-term inter-related changes
directly from raw data using multiple hidden layers. However,
this DL method has not been previously used to classify latent-
space representation of network traffic features.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid DL framework, called
LAE-BLSTM, for efficient botnet detection in IoT networks
using LAE and deep BLSTM algorithms. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are as follows:
1) A single hidden-layered LAE is proposed for feature
dimensionality reduction. This method reduces the di-
mensionality of large-scale IoT network traffic data
and produces a low-dimensional latent-space feature
representation at the hidden layer without loosing useful
intrinsic network information;
2) A deep BLSTM is proposed for network traffic clas-
sification. This method analyses the long-term inter-
related changes in low-dimensional feature set produced
by LAE to distinguish botnet attack traffic from benign
traffic in IoT networks;
3) Extensive experiments are performed with the Bot-IoT
dataset to validate the effectiveness of LAE-BLSTM in
binary and multi-class classification scenarios.
4) The performance of state-of-the-art optimisation algo-
rithms was investigated and compared to ensure effi-
cient feature dimensionality reduction and botnet attack
detection in IoT networks.
The remaining parts of the paper is organized as follows:
In Section II, we review related state-of-the-art methods for
feature dimensionality reduction and network traffic classifi-
cation. In Section III, we describe the hybrid DL framework
(LAE-BLSTM) proposed for botnet detection in IoT networks.
Extensive experiments are performed in Section IV to validate
the effectiveness of LAE-BLSTM. Experimentation results are
presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Although several datasets are available for network intrusion
detection, they have various challenges, including lack of
reliable labels, low attack diversity, redundancy of network
traffic, and missing ground truth. For instance, KDD Cup99
and NSL-KDD datasets are popularly used, but they are
outdated, and they do not reflect current normal and attack
scenarios [36], [37]. The application of the DEFCON-8 dataset
is limited because of the low number of benign traffic samples
[36]. The attack scenarios in the UNIBS dataset are limited
to DoS; the network traffic data are presented in packets with
no extracted features, and the labels were not provided [38].
CAIDA datasets have no ground truth information about the
attack samples [38]. Network traffic samples in the LBNL
dataset were not labeled, and the features were not extracted
from the packet files [38]. Attack samples in the UNSW-NB15
dataset were generated in a synthetic environment [39]. ISCX
and CICIDS2017 datasets were generated based on the concept
of profiling, and this can be due to their innate complexity.
Also, the ground truth of these datasets is not available to
enhance the labeling process. Not much information is given
about the botnet scenarios that were used in most datasets [36],
[38]–[40]. Also, IoT network traffic data was not included in
related datasets [36], [39], [41]–[44].
Bot-IoT dataset [33] is the most relevant dataset that is
publicly available for network-based botnet attack detection
in IoT networks. To realise this dataset, an IoT network
testbed was set up to generate benign and malicious network
traffic using heterogeneous communication protocols which
include User Datagram Protocol (UDP), Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Internet Protocol version-
6 ICMP (IPv6-ICMP), Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP), and Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP).
The testbed setup comprised a variety of IoT devices, includ-
ing a weather station, smart fridge, motion-activated lights,
remotely-activated garage door, and smart thermostat. Also,
millions of IoT botnet attack traffic samples were included
in Bot-IoT. These attack traffic samples can be categorized
into four IoT botnet scenarios, namely: DDoS, DoS, recon-
naissance and information theft.
Feature dimensionality reduction is mostly achieved by
applying either linear or non-linear transformation technique
to high-dimensional feature set. Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) [45] is one of the common linear transformation
methods while kernel methods [46], spectral methods [47]
and DL methods [48] employ non-linear transformation tech-
niques. Autoencoder is an unsupervised DL method that
produces latent-space representation of input data at the hidden
layer. Different autoencoder architectures have been proposed
to reduce the feature dimensionality in most popular net-
work intrusion datasets. These methods were implemented
and evaluated with the network traffic data in publicly avail-
able datasets which include KDD-Cup99 [49]–[56], NSL-
KDD [49], [57]–[60], UNSW-NB15 [50], [59], [61] and CI-
CIDS2017 [62]. Table I shows the autoencoder-based feature
dimensionality reduction techniques in the literature. The
original feature dimensionality, feature reduction method, new
feature dimensionality, classifier and classification scenarios
were provided. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is a variant
of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and it has the capacity to
learn long-term dependencies in network traffic features [63]–
[65]. However, none of the proposed autoencoder-based meth-
ods in Table I was implemented nor validated with Bot-IoT
dataset.
Different feature selection methods have been proposed
to reduce the dimensionality of network traffic features in
Bot-IoT dataset. Table II presents an overview of state-
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TABLE I
DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION OF NETWORK TRAFFIC FEATURES USING AUTOENCODER
Dataset Ref. Input features Reduction method Output features Classifier Classificationscenarios
KDD-Cup99
[49] 41 Stacked deep autoencoder 28 RF Binary, multi-class
[50] 41 Stacked deep autoencoder 10 Softmax Binary, multi-class
[51] 122 Autoencoder 100 CNN, softmax Multi-class
[52] 41 Autoencoder - k-means Binary
[53] 41 Stacked autoencoder 13, 5 Decision tree Binary
[54] 41 Variational autoencoder 20 Dictionary Binary
[55] 41 Autoencoder 18 k-means Multi-class
[56] 39 Autoencoder 3 k-means Binary
NSL-KDD
[49] 41 Stacked deep autoencoder 28 RF Binary, multi-class
[57] 122 Stacked sparse autoencoder - SVM Binary, multi-class
[58] 115 Stacked sparse autoencoder 10 Logistic Binary, multi-class
[59] 41 Deep autoencoder 3 Deep FFNN Binary, multi-class
[60] 52 Autoencoder 2 - Multi-class
UNSW-B15
[50] 42 Stacked deep autoencoder 10 Softmax Binary, multi-class
[61] 207 Semi-supervised autoencoder 2 Decision tree Binary, multi-class
[59] 41 Deep autoencoder 3 Deep FFNN Binary, multi-class
CICIDS2017 [62] 81 Stacked sparse autoencoder 64 RF Binary, multi-class
Bot-IoT Thispaper 37 LAE 6 Deep BLSTM Binary, multi-class
TABLE II
DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION OF NETWORK TRAFFIC FEATURES IN
BOT-IOT DATASET













[35] IFG 13 C5 decision tree,One-class SVM Multi-class
This
paper LAE 6 Deep BLSTM
Binary,
Multi-class
of-the-art feature dimensionality reduction methods that are
related to this paper. Koroniotis et al. [33] employed PCE
method for feature selection. The authors reported that 10
optimal network traffic features were selected. These include
seq, stddev, N_IN_Conn_P_SrcIP, min, state_number, mean,
N_IN_Conn_P_DstIP, drate, srate and max. Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) models were trained with the
optimal features to perform binary classification in general
and specific attack detection scenarios. Asadi et al. [34]
identified optimal feature clusters and eliminated outliers
using XMP technique. Most relevant network traffic features
were selected based on the XMP method. The best binary
classification performance was recorded when SVM, Dense
Neural Network (DNN) and C4.5 decision tree classifiers
were trained with 10 network traffic features. These net-
work traffic features include Proto, state_number, dur, mean,
dpkts, drate, TnBPSrcIP, TnP_PSrcIP, TnP_Per_Dport and
N_IN_Conn_P_DstIP. Khraisat et al. [35] selected 13 network
traffic features using information gain (entropy) method. These
features include dport, seq, dur, flgs_number, flgs, sport,
N_IN_Conn_P_DstIP, srate, AR_P_Proto_P_Sport, daddr,
TnBPDstIP, rate and AR_P_Proto_P_SrcIP. An ensemble
classifier, which comprised of C5 decision tree and One-Class
SVM (OCSVM) models, was trained with the selected network
traffic features to perform multi-label classification.
To ensure a fair comparison, feature dimensionality reduc-
tion methods that do not include benign network traffic traces
and all the four botnet attack scenarios in the Bot-IoT dataset
were not included in this paper. For instance, Soe et al. [66] did
not consider the DoS attack scenario. Also, the performance
of the method in detecting benign network traffic was not
reported. In a similar work [67], the authors did not evaluate
the performance of the proposed method. In another work [68],
Guerra-Manzanares et al. did not evaluate the performance of
the proposed method with the network traffic data in the Bot-
IoT dataset.
In summary, the state-of-the-art methods in the related work
focused on the selection of specific features from available
network traffic information available in the Bot-IoT dataset.
However, this approach may likely affect the efficiency of
botnet attack detection in IoT networks because the classifiers
will not have access to some relevant network information
during training, validation, and testing. Consequently, the
feature selection approach may lead to low botnet attack
detection accuracy and a high false alarm rate in IoT networks.
On the other hand, LAE reduces the dimensionality of big IoT
network traffic data and produces a low-dimensional latent-
space feature representation at the hidden layer without loosing
useful intrinsic network information.
III. PROPOSED METHOD FOR BOTNET ATTACK
DETECTION IN IOT NETWORKS
In this section, we propose a hybrid DL framework, named
LAE-BLSTM, for efficient botnet attack detection in IoT
networks. The description of LAE and deep BLSTM methods
is presented in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. In this
paper, boldface uppercase alphabets and boldface lower case
alphabets represent matrices and column vectors respectively.
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Algorithm 1: LAE algorithm
Input: X
Initialization: h0 ( 9) = x( 9),∀ 9 ∈ [1, :]
ℎ3 (0) = G(3), ∀3 ∈ [1, =]
Output: X̃
1 for 3 = 1 to = do
2 for 9 = 1 to : do
3 i 9 = fA
(
W8Gx 9 +W8ℎh 9−1 + b8
)
4 f 9 = fA
(
W 5 Gx 9 +W 5 ℎh 9−1 + b 5
)
5 c̃ 9 = fℎ
(
W2̃Gx 9 +W2̃ℎh 9−1 + b2̃
)
6 c 9 = D8  c̃ 9 + D 5  c 9−1






















Autoencoder is an unsupervised DL method which anal-
yses the dynamic relationships between the features of high-
dimensional data and produces a low-dimensional latent-space
representation. Unlike the conventional Autoencoder, LAE
employs LSTM units to model the long-term inter-related
changes in network traffic features. In this subsection, LAE
method is developed to reduce feature dimensionality of big
IoT network traffic data and obtain a low-dimensional latent-
space feature representation with minimum reconstruction
error.
A sequence of network traffic features is represented by a









where {X3}=3=1 = X1,X2, . . . ,X=, : ∈ Z
+ is the number of
network traffic features, and = ∈ Z+ is the total instances of
network traffic available in the dataset. An instance of network
traffic is represented by Equation 2:
{x 9 }:9=1 = x1, x2, . . . , x: , (2)
where x 9 ∈ R= is a network traffic feature vector.
The encoder part of a single hidden layered LSTM autoen-
coder [69] was used to compress the network traffic feature
matrix given by Equation 2 with the aim of reducing its
dimensionality without loosing the information contained in
the original data. LSTM has the capability to learn long time-
dependencies with its feedback connections and a recurrent
memory unit that is controlled by three gates, namely, input
gate, a forget gate and an output gate [70]. LAE accepts high-
dimensional network traffic feature set, X, and produces a low-
dimensional latent-space representation, X̃, at the hidden layer.
The input gate vector (i 9 ), forget gate vector (f 9 ), memory cell
state vector (c 9 ), output gate vector (o 9 ) and hidden state vector
(h 9 ) were formed based on the LAE algorithm presented
in Algorithm 1. The dimension of the column vectors is
represented by i 9 , f 9 , c 9 , o 9 , h 9 ∈ RD , where D is the number of
Algorithm 2: Deep BLSTM algorithm
Input: X̃
Target: y
Initialization: h0 ( 9) = x( 9),∀ 9 ∈ [1, D]
ℎ3 (0) = G(3), ∀3 ∈ [1, =]
Output: ỹ
1 for 3 = 1 to = do
2 for 9 = 1 to D do
3 %% Forward direction
4
−→
i 9 = fA
(−→










f 9 = fA
(−→










c 9 = fℎ
(−→















f 9  −→c 9−1
8
−→o 9 = fA
(−→

















































14 %% Backward direction
15
←−
i 9 = fA
(←−










f 9 = fA
(←−










c 9 = fℎ
(←−















f 9  ←−c 9−1
19
←−o 9 = fA
(←−







































































LSTM hidden units that represent the desired network traffic
feature dimensionality.
Weight matrices and bias vectors were obtained by
training the LAE using the Back Propagation Through
Time (BPTT) algorithm [71]. The weight matrices for the
connections between the input and the recurrent gates are
given as W8G ,W 5 G ,W2̃G ,W>G ∈ RD×=, and these are the
weight matrices of input-to-input gate connection, input-to-
forget gate connection, input-to-cell connection and input-to-
output gate connection respectively. Similarly, weight matrices
for connections between the recurrent gates and the hidden
state are given as W8ℎ ,W 5 ℎ ,W2̃ℎ ,W>ℎ ∈ RD×D , and these are
the weight matrices of input gate-to-hidden state connection,
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forget gate-to-hidden state connection, cell state-to-hidden
state connection and output gate-to-hidden state connection
respectively. On the other hand, b8 , b 5 , b2̃ , b> ∈ RD are the
bias vectors of input gate, forget gate, cell state and output
gate respectively. Recurrent activation function is a sigmoid
function and it is represented by fA . Hidden layer activation
function is represented by fℎ . Diagonal matrices, D8 and D 5 ,
are formed with input gate vector and forget gate vectors as
represented by Equations 3 and 4 respectively:












For x 9 , the encoded output is given in Equation 5.
x̃ 9 = :q (x 9 , c 9−1), (5)
where c 9−1 is the previous cell state vector and :q is the
encoding function. Finally, the low-dimensional network traffic










Conventional LSTM is unidirectional and it can only cap-
ture the dependence of the current state based on previous
context [72]. Meanwhile, BLSTM has full access to both past
and future sequential information using two LSTM hidden
layers to scan input data sequence in positive and negative
time directions respectively [73]. Therefore, a deep BLSTM
method is developed to efficiently detect IoT botnet attack
traffic by analysing the long-term inter-related changes in low-
dimensional features produced by LAE.
Reduced network traffic feature set, X̃, and its corresponding
target vector, ỹ, were fed into a deep BLSTM model to




i 9 ), forget gate vectors (
−→
f 9 ,←−
f 9 ), memory cell state vectors (−→c 9 , ←−c 9 ), output gate vectors




h 9 ) based on the
BLSTM algorithm provided in Algorithm 2. These column

















W( ·) ) and bias vectors
(
−→
b ( ·) ,
←−
b ( ·) ) were obtained by training the BLSTM using the
BPTT algorithm. Recurrent activation function is a sigmoid
function and it is represented by fA ; hidden layer activation
function is represented by fℎ; while output layer activation
function is a softmax function and it is represented by fH . The
parameters of the forward LSTM hidden layer are computed
from the past to the present input data sequence while those
of the backward LSTM hidden layer are calculated starting
from the future to the present input data sequence. The LSTM
hidden layers in the positive and negative time directions are
jointly connected to the output layer. The difference between
the predicted output of LAE-BLSTM, ỹ, and the target output,
y, is minimized in Equation 7.








where \ is either a binary cross-entropy loss function for bi-
nary classification or a categorical cross-entropy loss function
for multi-class classification scenarios.
IV. FEATURE DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION AND
NETWORK TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we implement the hybrid DL framework
proposed in Section III (i.e. LAE-BLSTM) and perform exten-
sive experiments with Bot-IoT [33] to validate its effectiveness
for botnet attack detection in IoT networks. The overall
architecture of LAE-BLSTM is shown in Fig. 1.
All the experiments performed in this paper leveraged
Numpy, Pandas, Scikit-learn and Keras libraries in Python
programming language. Python codes were written and imple-
mented within Spyder Integrated Development Environment
(IDE) running on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS workstation with the
following specifications: Random Access Memory (32 GB),
Processor (Intel Core i7-9700K CPU @ 3.60GHz × 8), Graph-
ics (GeForce RTX 2080 Ti/PXCIe/SSE2) and 64-bit Operating
System (OS).
A. Data pre-processing
Large network traffic data in Bot-IoT dataset was pre-
processed to transform the features and the ground truth labels
into appropriate formats for ease of computation. In this study,
data pre-processing involves the following: (a) elimination
of redundant network information; (a) random division of
complete network traffic data into training, validation and
testing sets; (b) selection of network traffic features and ground
truth labels; (c) normalization or scaling of network traffic
features; and (d) integer encoding of ground truth labels.
Redundant network traffic information (pkSeqID, saddr,
daddr, proto, state and flgs) were removed from Bot-IoT.
Therefore, only 37 out of the 43 network traffic features were
selected to form high-dimensional network traffic feature set.
The description of each of the 43 features are provided in [33].
The high-dimensional feature set was randomly divided into
training set (70%), validation set (15%) and testing set (15%)
with reference to most recent works covering diverse areas of
application, e.g., [74]–[79]. Table III presents the distribution
of data samples in training, validation and testing sets under
binary and multi-class classification scenarios. Elements of the
high-dimensional feature set were normalized to a range of





where x is a network traffic feature vector; while x<8= and
x<0G are the minimum and maximum values of x respectively.
This method retains the original distribution of network traffic
features. The pre-processed high-dimensional network traffic
feature set was named RAW-F.
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Fig. 1. LAE-BLSTM architecture for botnet attack detection in IoT networks
TABLE III
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF IOT NETWORK TRAFFIC DATA
Classification Target Training Validation Testingscenario
Binary Attack 2,567,548 550,303 550,194Normal 325 67 85
Multi-class
DDoS 1,348,654 288,809 289,161
DoS 1,155,031 247,680 247,549
Normal 325 67 85
Reconn. 63,806 13,800 13,476
Theft 57 14 8
On the other hand, binary and multi-class ground truth
labels were converted into integer format for ease of compu-
tation. Specifically, binary ground truth labels i.e. attack and
normal were represented by 0 and 1 respectively. Similarly,
multi-class ground truth labels i.e. DDoS, DoS, normal, re-
connaissance and theft were represented by 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4
respectively.
B. LAE for feature dimensionality reduction
LAE model was developed to reduce the feature dimen-
sionality and the data size of RAW-F such that the limited
available memory space in IoT devices will be sufficient
for network traffic data storage. The internal architecture of
LAE is shown in Fig. 1, and its working principles were
discussed earlier in Section IIIA. This DL method employed
the following hyperparameters: a single LSTM layer, 37 input
neurons, six neurons at the LSTM layer, a Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) activation function, Mean Square Error (MSE)
as a loss function, a learning rate of 0.001, 10 epochs, and
a batch size of 64. LAE models were trained with state-
of-the-art optimisation algorithms that are available in Keras
ML library2. These optimisation algorithms include Adaptive
moment estimation (Adam) [80], Stochastic Gradient De-
scent with Nesterov momentum (SGD) [81], RMSprop [82],
Adadelta [83], Adagrad [84], Adamax [80], Adam with Nes-
terov momentum (Nadam) [85], and Follow The Regularised
Leader (FTRL) [86]. To ensure efficient feature dimensionality
reduction, we investigated and compared the performance of
LAE model when each of these optimisation algorithms was
used. The performance evaluation was based on reconstruction
loss, data size of low-dimensional features, and the rate of
feature dimensionality reduction. Finally, the performance of
the optimal LAE model was compared with that of three state-
of-the-art feature dimensionality reduction methods i.e. PCE
[33], XMP [34], and IFG [35]. The low-dimensional features
produced by LAE, PCE [33], XMP [34], and IFG [35] methods
are referred to as PCE-F, XMP-F, and IFG-F, respectively.
2https://keras.io/api/optimizers
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C. Deep BLSTM for network traffic classification
Given the low-dimensional feature set, LAE-F, binary and
multi-class deep BLSTM models were developed to correctly
detect benign network traffic and botnet attack traffic in IoT
networks. The network architecture of deep BLSTM model is
shown in Fig. 1, and its principles of operation were previously
explained in Section IIIB. In this paper, a deep BLSTM model
comprised of a single LSTM layer with six input neurons, four
dense hidden layers, and an output layer. The LSTM layer
and the four dense hidden layers have 100 output neurons
each. The output layer used a single neuron and five neurons
for binary and multi-class classification, respectively. ReLU
activation function was employed in all the layers of deep
BLSTM model, except the output layer. A sigmoid activation
function and a softmax activation function were employed
at the output layer for binary and multi-class classification,
respectively. The hyperparameters that were used to train deep
BLSTM model include: a learning rate of 0.0001, 20 epochs, a
batch size of 64, as well as a binary cross-entropy loss function
and a categorical cross-entropy loss function for binary and
multi-class classification, respectively. Deep BLSTM models
were trained with Adam, SGD, RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad,
Adamax, Nadam, and FTRL optimisation algorithms.
Table III shows that the distribution of network traffic
samples in Bot-IoT dataset is highly imbalanced across the
classes in both binary and multi-class classification scenarios.
It has been experimentally proven that class imbalance affects
the value and meaning of traditional classification performance
metrics as they become bias in favour of the majority class
[87]. Therefore, highly imbalanced data classification cannot
be evaluated using traditional performance metrics. In a case
where both classification successes and errors are to be con-
sidered, Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) is the best
null-biased performance metric for highly imbalanced data
classification [87]. The value of MCC is calculated using Eq.
(9):
" =
()% × )#) − (% × #)√
()% + %) ()% + #) ()# + %) ()# + #)
,
(9)
where TP is the number of IoT botnet attack samples that
are correctly classified as IoT botnet attack traffic; FP is the
number of normal samples that are misclassified as IoT botnet
attack traffic; TN is the number of normal samples that are
correctly classified as normal traffic; and FN is the number
of IoT botnet attack samples that are misclassified as normal
traffic.
For efficient network traffic classification, we investigated
and compared the performance of deep BLSTM model when
each of these optimisation algorithms was used. The per-
formance of these models was evaluated with the training,
validation and testing sets. We analysed the training loss, val-
idation loss, and MCC values to determine the most efficient
optimisation algorithm for deep BLSTM model. In binary
classification scenario, the performance of the optimal deep
BLSTM model was compared with that of four state-of-the-art
classifiers i.e. SVM [33], RNN [33], LSTM [33], and VCDL
[88]. In multi-class classification scenario, the performance of
the optimal deep BLSTM model was compared with that of
three state-of-the-art classifiers i.e. FNN [89], SNN [89], and
C5-OCSVM [35].
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present and analyse the results of the
experiments performed in Section IV to validate the effec-
tiveness of LAE-BLSTM model for botnet attack detection
in IoT networks. The performance of LAE-BLSTM model
is compared with that of the state-of-the-art ML and DL
models in binary and multi-class classification scenarios. In
this context, LAE-BLSTM model is considered to be efficient
if it meets all the following conditions:
1) Relatively low memory space requirement for big net-
work traffic data storage. This is evaluated based on re-
construction loss, data size of low-dimensional features,
and the rate of feature dimensionality reduction. Low
reconstruction loss, low data size, and high reduction
rate imply that relatively low memory space is required
for big network traffic data storage.
2) Robustness against model under-fitting and over-fitting.
Model under-fitting is evaluated based on the training
loss and the MCC value obtained when deep BLSTM
model was evaluated with the training set. Model over-
fitting is evaluated based on the validation loss and MCC
value obtained when deep BLSTM model was evaluated
with the validation set. Low training loss and high MCC
value on training set imply that deep BLSTM model is
robust against model under-fitting. On the other hand,
low validation loss and high MCC value on validation set
imply that deep BLSTM model is robust against model
over-fitting.
3) Good generalization ability. This is evaluated based on
the MCC values obtained when deep BLSTM model
was evaluated with the testing set. High MCC values on
testing set implies that deep BLSTM model performs
well on previously unseen network traffic data.
A. Results of feature dimensionality reduction
To determine the most suitable optimiser for efficient fea-
ture dimensionality reduction, we analyse the reconstruction
losses generated when Adam, SGD, RMSprop, Adadelta,
Adagrad, Adamax, Nadam, and FTRL optimisation algorithms
were used to train LAE model. Fig. 2 shows that the use
of Adam optimiser produced the lowest reconstruction loss
(0.0041 − 0.0023) throughout the 10-epoch training period.
Table IV shows that the use of Adam optimiser outperformed
the use of the other seven optimisers by 39.55 − 89.33%.
Data sizes of the low-dimensional feature sets (PCE-F,
XMP-F, IFG-F, and LAE-F) were compared with that of
the original feature set (RAW-F) to evaluate the impact of
feature dimensionality reduction methods. Table V shows that
LAE and state-of-the-art methods significantly reduced the
data size of RAW-F. However, LAE achieved the lowest
data size (88.04 MB) with a reduction rate of 91.89%. This
method outperformed XMP [34], IFG [35], and PCE [33]
methods by 18.92%, 18.92%, and 27.03%, respectively. The
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Fig. 2. Trends of reconstruction loss during the training of LAE
TABLE IV










implementation of the DL method in memory-constraint IoT
devices becomes more practicable for efficient botnet detection
when the data size of the network traffic feature set is as small
as possible.
B. Results of network traffic classification in binary scenario
To determine the most suitable optimiser for efficient net-
work traffic classification in binary scenario, we analyse the
training losses, validation losses, and MCC values obtained
when deep BLSTM model was trained with Adam, SGD,
RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax, Nadam, and FTRL
optimisation algorithms.
Fig. 3 shows the training losses of deep BLSTM model in
binary classification scenario when each of the eight optimi-
sation algorithms was used. In all cases, the training losses
reduced as the number of epochs increased from 1 to 20.
However, deep BLSTM model had the lowest training losses
TABLE V
NETWORK TRAFFIC FEATURE SETS
Feature set Feature size Data size (MB) Reduction rate (%)
RAW-F 37 1085.88 -
PCE-F [33] 10 293.48 72.97
XMP-F [34] 10 293.48 72.97
IFG-F [35] 13 381.53 64.86
LAE-F 6 88.04 91.89


























Fig. 3. Training losses of deep BLSTM model in binary classification scenario
when Nadam optimiser was employed. The values of training
losses produced by Adam optimiser were very close to those of
Nadam optimiser. At the end of the 20-epoch training, Nadam
optimiser achieved a training loss of 8.19× 10−5 while that of
Adam optimiser was 8.39 × 10−5. On the other hand, SGD,
RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax and FTRL optimisers
produced relatively high training losses of 0.0011, 0.0006,
0.0013, 0.0013, 0.0003, and 0.0014, respectively.































Fig. 4. Validation losses of deep BLSTM model in binary classification
scenario
Fig. 4 shows the validation losses of deep BLSTM model
in binary classification scenario when each of the eight op-
timisation algorithms was used. In all cases, the validation
losses reduced as the number of epochs increased from 1 to
20. However, deep BLSTM model had the lowest validation
losses when Nadam optimiser was employed. The values of
validation losses produced by Adam optimiser were very close
to those of Nadam optimiser. At the end of the 20-epoch
validation, Nadam optimiser achieved a validation loss of
8.75× 10−5 while that of Adam optimiser was 0.0001. On the
other hand, SGD, RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax and
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TABLE VI
MCC VALUES OF DEEP BLSTM MODEL IN BINARY CLASSIFICATION
SCENARIO
Model Training (%) Validation (%) Testing (%)
Adam 91.67 89.55 93.03
SGD null null null
RMSprop 63.79 62.29 52.36
Adadelta null null null
Adagrad null null null
Adamax 82.38 78.41 82.61
Nadam 93.04 90.66 95.80
FTRL null null null
FTRL optimisers produced relatively high validation losses of
0.0011, 0.0008, 0.0013, 0.0013, 0.0003, and 0.0014, respec-
tively.
Table VI presents the MCC values of deep BLSTM model
in binary classification scenario when each of the eight opti-
misation algorithms was used. For SGD, Adadelta, Adagrad,
and FTRL optimisers, deep BLSTM model correctly classified
all the samples in the attack class as botnet attack traffic but
it misclassified all the samples in the normal class as botnet
attack traffic. In these cases, the values of TN and FN were
zero. Based on Eq. (9), the MCC values were undefined when
deep BLSTM model was evaluated with network traffic data
in the training, validation, and testing sets. This shows that
SGD, Adadelta, Adagrad, and FTRL optimisers could not
handle the class imbalance problem in Bot-IoT dataset. The
classifier was biased in favour of the attack (majority) class
because the number of samples in this class is far greater than
those in the normal class (see Table III). On the other hand,
Nadam optimiser produced the highest MCC values when deep
BLSTM model was evaluated with network traffic samples
in the training, validation, and testing sets. Nadam optimiser
achieved an overall MCC of 93.17%, and it outperformed
Adam, RMSprop, and Adamax optimisers by 1.91%, 33.69%
and 12.03%, respectively. Fig. 5 shows the confusion matrix
of deep BLSTM model when Nadam optimiser was used for
binary classification. The detection rate of normal traffic was

























Fig. 5. Confusion matrix of deep BLSTM model in binary classification
scenario
TABLE VII








Finally, the performance of LAE-BLSTM model was com-
pared with that of state-of-the-art models in binary classifica-
tion scenario. Table VII shows that LAE-BLSTM model out-
performed PCE-SVM [33], PCE-RNN [33], PCE-LSTM [33],
and PCE-VCDL [88] models by 90.03%, 87.19%, 86.14%,
and 72.75%, respectively.
C. Results of network traffic classification in multi-class sce-
nario
To determine the most suitable optimiser for network traffic
classification in multi-class scenario, we analyse the training
losses, validation losses, and MCC values obtained when deep
BLSTM model was trained with Adam, SGD, RMSprop,
Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax, Nadam, and FTRL optimisation
algorithms.





























Fig. 6. Training losses of deep BLSTM model in multi-class classification
scenario
Fig. 6 shows the training losses of deep BLSTM model
in multi-class classification scenario when each of the eight
optimisation algorithms was used. In all cases, the training
losses reduced as the number of epochs increased from 1 to 20.
However, deep BLSTM model had the lowest training losses
when Adam optimiser was employed. The values of training
losses produced by Nadam optimiser were very close to those
of Adam optimiser. At the end of the 20-epoch training,
Adam optimiser achieved a training loss of 0.0389 while that
of Nadam optimiser was 0.0421. On the other hand, SGD,
RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax and FTRL optimisers
produced relatively high training losses of 0.6524, 0.0953,
0.6992, 0.6328, 0.0680, and 0.7913, respectively.
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Fig. 7. Validation losses of deep BLSTM model in multi-class classification
scenario
TABLE VIII
MCC VALUES OF DEEP BLSTM MODEL FOR TRAINING IN MULTI-CLASS
CLASSIFICATION SCENARIO
Optimiser DDoS DoS Norm Recon Theft Mean
Adam 98.33 98.31 93.34 99.96 93.66 96.72
SGD 57.83 57.18 null 99.62 null 42.93
RMSprop 92.78 92.71 null 99.47 null 56.99
Adadelta 27.86 24.79 null 71.05 null 24.74
Adagrad 36.07 35.71 null 98.73 null 34.10
Adamax 94.98 94.94 73.05 99.82 null 72.56
Nadam 98.97 98.96 92.88 99.96 93.68 96.89
FTRL 19.24 15.00 null 98.10 null 26.47
Fig. 7 shows the validation losses of deep BLSTM model
in multi-class classification scenario when each of the eight
optimisation algorithms was used. In all cases, the validation
losses reduced as the number of epochs increased from 1 to 20.
However, deep BLSTM model had the lowest validation losses
when Adam optimiser was employed. The values of validation
losses produced by Nadam optimiser were very close to those
of Adam optimiser. At the end of the 20-epoch validation,
Adam optimiser achieved a validation loss of 0.0325 while
that of Adam optimiser was 0.0326. On the other hand, SGD,
RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax and FTRL optimisers
produced relatively high validation losses of 0.6503, 0.0640,
0.6988, 0.6310, 0.0656, and 0.7920, respectively.
TABLE IX
MCC VALUES OF DEEP BLSTM MODEL FOR VALIDATION IN
MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION SCENARIO
Optimiser DDoS DoS Norm Recon Theft Mean
Adam 98.28 98.26 90.10 99.94 96.36 96.59
SGD 57.96 57.31 null 99.63 null 42.98
RMSprop 92.76 92.70 null 99.49 null 56.99
Adadelta 28.11 25.02 null 71.00 null 24.83
Adagrad 36.18 35.82 null 98.73 null 73.21
Adamax 94.97 94.93 76.29 99.83 null 73.21
Nadam 98.94 98.93 89.83 99.93 96.36 96.80
FTRL 19.24 15.00 null 98.10 null 26.47
TABLE X
MCC VALUES OF DEEP BLSTM MODEL FOR TESTING IN MULTI-CLASS
CLASSIFICATION SCENARIO
Optimiser DDoS DoS Norm Recon Theft Mean
Adam 98.33 98.31 91.34 99.94 100.00 97.58
SGD 57.78 57.14 null 99.55 null 42.90
RMSprop 92.74 92.68 null 99.44 null 56.97
Adadelta 27.76 24.72 null 70.53 null 24.60
Adagrad 35.96 35.61 null 98.54 null 34.02
Adamax 95.01 94.97 71.38 99.76 null 72.23
Nadam 98.98 98.97 92.94 99.95 100.00 98.17
FTRL 18.79 14.56 null 97.94 null 26.26
Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of deep BLSTM
model when each of the eight optimisation algorithms was
used in multi-class classification scenario. Table VIII presents
the MCC values of deep BLSTM model when evaluated with
network traffic samples in the training set. Adam optimiser
achieved the highest MCC value in detecting normal traffic.
Nadam optimiser achieved the highest MCC values in de-
tecting DDoS, DoS, reconnaissance, and theft attacks. This
optimiser outperformed Adam, SGD, RMSprop, Adadelta,
Adagrad, Adamax, and FTRL optimisers by 0.08%, 53.87%,
39.81%, 72.06%, 62.70%, 24.24%, and 62.70%, respectively.
Table IX presents the MCC values of deep BLSTM model
when evaluated with network traffic samples in the validation
set. Nadam optimiser achieved the highest MCC values in
all classes. This optimiser outperformed Adam, SGD, RM-
Sprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax, and FTRL optimisers by
0.21%%, 53.82%, 39.81%, 71.97%, 23.59%, 23.59%, and
70.33%, respectively. Table X presents the MCC values of
deep BLSTM model when evaluated with network traffic
samples in the testing set. Nadam optimiser achieved the
highest MCC values in all classes. This optimiser outper-
formed Adam, SGD, RMSprop, Adadelta, Adagrad, Adamax,
and FTRL optimisers by 0.59%, 55.27%, 41.20%, 73.57%,




















































 DDoS  DoS  Normal Reconn  Theft
Ground-truth labels
 DDoS 















Fig. 8. Confusion matrix of deep BLSTM model in multi-class classification
scenario
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TABLE XI
PERFORMANCE IN ML/DL MODELS IN MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
SCENARIO
Model DDoS DoS Norm Recon Theft Mean
PCE-FNN [89] - - - - - 89.00
PCE-SNN [89] - - - - - 85.00
IFG-CSVM [35] 99.38 99.53 88.91 44.76 99.32 86.38
LAE-BLSTM 98.96 98.95 91.89 99.95 96.68 97.29
Fig. 8 shows the confusion matrix of deep BLSTM model
when Nadam optimiser was used for multi-class classification.
The detection rates of DDoS, DoS, normal, reconnaissance,
and theft were 99.5%, 99.4%, 92.90%, 100%, and 100%,
respectively. Finally, the performance of LAE-BLSTM model
was compared with that of state-of-the-art models in multi-
class classification scenario. Table XI shows that LAE-BLSTM
model outperformed PCE-FNN [89], PCE-SNN [89], and
IFG-CSVM [35] models by 8.29%, 12.29%, and 10.91%,
respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
LAE-BLSTM, an hybrid DL method, was proposed for
efficient botnet detection in IoT networks using LAE and
deep BLSTM algorithms. The effectiveness of this method was
validated by performing extensive experiments with the most
relevant publicly available dataset (Bot-IoT) in binary and
multi-class classification scenarios. Simulation results showed
that LAE model achieved the highest data size reduction rate
of 91.89%, outperforming XMP [34], IFG [35], and PCE [33]
methods by 18.92%, 18.92%, and 27.03%, respectively. As
the data size of big network traffic features becomes smaller,
the implementation of DL method in memory-constraint IoT
devices seems to be more practicable for efficient botnet detec-
tion. In addition, deep BLSTM model, which were trained to
analyse the long-term inter-related changes in low-dimensional
feature set produced by LAE, demonstrated robustness against
model under-fitting and over-fitting as well as good generaliza-
tion ability. Therefore, LAE-BLSTM has proven to be efficient
for botnet attack detection in IoT networks.
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